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A Disastrous Rejection: The Case for Including Community Associations under the 
Stafford Act’s Individuals and Households Program  
Jacob J. Franchino* 
 
I. Introduction 
In the waning days of October 2012, the hurricane-turned-post-tropical-cyclone, since 
referred to as “Super-Storm Sandy” (“Sandy”), carved its way through the Caribbean and up the 
east coast of the United States before finally making landfall on New Jersey’s coast.1  The 
devastation wrought by Sandy was significant; at final tally, the storm resulted in 147 deaths, 
damage and destruction to at least 650,000 homes, and massive power outages affecting millions 
of residents.2   
While Sandy’s wrath certainly cast a wide net, the damage to New Jersey and New York 
was particularly severe.  New York’s infrastructure was severely impacted, including, among 
other things, significant flooding to streets, major subway lines, and airports.3  Similarly, on the 
other side of the Hudson, Sandy caused an estimated $400 million in damage to New Jersey’s 
public transportation system.4  Across both states, the storm devastated beaches, roads, parks and 
utilities.5  The immensity of Sandy’s public devastation was matched only by its cost.  With 
approximately $50 billion in damages, Sandy was the second costliest weather event in 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A., 2011 Rutgers, the State University of New 
Jersey. I would like to offer special thanks to Professor Angela C. Carmella for the guidance and feedback she 
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1See, e.g., Doyle Rice, Weather Lessons from Super Storm Sandy, USA TODAY (Oct. 28, 2013, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2013/10/26/weather-hurricane-superstorm-sandy/3178777/. 
2Kathryn D. Sullivan & Louis W. Uccellini, Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy, October 22-29, 2012, NAT’L 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE iv (May 2013), 
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., Ginger Adams Otis, Hurricane Sandy, On Year Later: Tracing the Superstorm’s Path from Inception to 
Destruction, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Oct. 26, 2013, 5:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hurricane-
sandy/sandy-1-year-storm-winds-article-1.1495677 
2 
American history, behind only Hurricane Katrina.6  Among a number of other public assistance 
grants stemming from Sandy (totaling about $1.7 billion), the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) estimates that it provided almost $20 million to the New York Department of 
Transportation for debris removal, almost $5 million to the Long Beach Medical Center, $2.5 
million to the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and over $451,000 to 
the Hudson River Park Trust to repair its facilities.7   
Perhaps even more concerning than the public destruction and cost accompanying 
Sandy’s arrival was the storm’s impact on the private community.  According to the National 
Hurricane Center, “[t]he extent of catastrophic damage along the New Jersey coast was 
unprecedented in the state’s history,” adding that “[w]hole communities were inundated by water 
and sand, houses were washed from their foundations . . . .”8  In the storm’s aftermath, over 5 
million homes went without power, with outages often lasting for weeks. 9   Approximately 
346,000 housing units sustained at least some damage, and state officials deemed 22,000 of them 
uninhabitable.10   In New York, the story was similar.  Governor Cuomo estimated that an 
astonishing 305,000 homes in the state were destroyed in the storm, most by Sandy’s powerful 
surge.11 
Portending catastrophes such as Sandy, Congress passed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the “Stafford Act”) with the purpose of “[alleviating] the 
suffering and damage” resulting from disasters by “providing Federal assistance programs for 
                                                          
6 Rice, supra note 1.  
7 Public Assistance By the Numbers, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 23, 2013, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/08/23/public-assistance-numbers.  
8 ERIC S. BLAKE, TODD B. KIMBERLAIN, ROBERT J. BERG, JOHN P. CANGIALOSI & JOHN L. BEVEN II, NAT’L 
HURRICANE CTR., AL182012, TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE SANDY 17 (2013), available at 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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both public and private losses sustained in disasters.”12  Notably, through its Individuals and 
Households Program (“IHP”), the Stafford Act permits the distribution of federal grants to 
homeowners for both repairs and replacements of “owner-occupied” private residences damaged 
by a major disaster.13  According to its most recent reports, FEMA provided a combined $13 
billion in total federal aid to the recovery efforts in New York and New Jersey.14  Of this total 
figure, $996 million of New York’s total aid15 and $412 million of New Jersey’s total aid is 
going towards “individuals and households” claims.16 
While FEMA has distributed a substantial amount of assistance for “individuals and 
households” thus far, a regional peculiarity has revealed a gap in the IHP.  A substantial number 
of homeowners in the New York area own homes in common interest communities (planned 
communities, housing cooperatives, and condominiums).17  To various extents, common interest 
communities possess a certain level of collectively owned property which is held by and 
managed through a community association. 18   The gap in disaster coverage is manifest in 
FEMA’s view of community associations.19  While community associations are almost always 
non-profit organizations, composed exclusively of the homeowners in a given community,20 
                                                          
12 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5121(b)(6) (West 2013). 
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (c)(2)–(3) (West 2013). 
14 See New Jersey Recovery From Superstorm Sandy: By the Numbers, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Sept. 9, 
2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/09/03/new-jersey-recovery-superstorm-sandy-numbers 
(estimating total federal aid to New Jersey at $ 5.6 billion); New York: By the Numbers-42, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 29, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/08/29/new-york-numbers-42 
(estimating total federal aid to New York at over $ 8 billion). 
15 New York: By the Numbers-42, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 29 2013, 3:07 PM), 
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/08/29/new-york-numbers-42.  
16 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 14.  
17 Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu, & Jonathan Miller, The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical 
Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 276 (2007). 
18 JESSE DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY 896 (7th ed. 2010). 
19 Mireya Navarro, U.S. Rules Bar Aid to Co-ops Hit by Sandy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/nyregion/fema-policy-keeps-co-ops-from-disaster-aid.html?pagewanted=all. 
20 See DUKEMINIER, supra note 18. 
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FEMA views them as businesses.21  Because they are viewed as such, community associations 
are not eligible for federal aid under the IHP.22  This is especially problematic for homeowners in 
common interest communities with shared property elements such as outside walls, roofs, or 
other essentials of the home.23   
The confluence of the New York area’s peculiar housing situation, the Stafford Act’s 
failure to explicitly include community associations under IHP coverage, and FEMA’s 
designation of such associations as businesses, is preventing thousands of condominium and 
housing cooperative owners in New York and New Jersey from receiving the full benefit of 
federal disaster grants.24  After this gap in coverage became apparent, lawmakers in the New 
York area, anxious for relief, worked to create an amendment to the Stafford Act that would 
allow condominium and housing cooperatives the same coverage under the IHP as other 
homeowners. 25   This Comment argues that, because community associations are more 
appropriately viewed as an extension of their members as property owners, the proposed 
amendment to the Stafford Act should be passed in order to equally protect all homeowners from 
the burdens attendant to major disaster events.   
Part II of this Comment explores the different types of common interest communities and 
their unique legal status.  Part III outlines the nature of the federal aid generally available to 
homeowners under the Stafford Act’s IHP.  Part IV seizes upon the example of Hurricane Sandy 
to demonstrate the disastrous effects of the gap in coverage for common interest communities 
                                                          
21 See Navarro, supra note 19. 
22 Id. 
23 See Navarro, supra note 19. 
24 See Maura McDermott, After Sandy: Aid For Co-Ops and Condos, NEWSDAY, March 7, 2013, at A05, available 
at 2013 WLNR 5588292. 
25 H.R. 2887, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1480, 113th Cong. (2013).  See Press Release, Rep. Steve Israel, Rep. Israel 
Announces Legislation to Make Co-Ops and Condos Eligible for Storm Recovery Grants (July 29, 2013), available 
at http://israel.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-israel-announces-legislation-to-make-co-ops-and-condos-
eligible-for.  
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under the Stafford Act and elaborates on the amendments proposed to correct it.  Finally, by 
demonstrating the impracticality of viewing community associations as businesses and thus 
preventing them the benefit of IHP grants, Part V lends support to the legislative effort to amend 
the act to include condominium associations and housing cooperatives.  Part VI concludes. 
II. The Legal Underpinnings of Common Interest Communities 
As of 2012, approximately 25.9 million housing units in the United States were in 
common interest communities.26  Nearly 64 million residents live across the nation’s 323,600 
common interest communities, and over the last half-century that number has continued to 
grow.27  In New York and New Jersey alone, there are a combined 19,000 common interest 
communities, accounting for almost 6 percent of common interest communities nationwide.28 
 Common Interest Communities are “[r]eal-estate development[s] or neighborhood[s] in 
which individually owned lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation 
that cannot be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal.”29   All common interest communities are 
unified by three characteristics.   First, membership in a community association is required for all 
individual owners within that particular community.30  Second, each owner in a community is 
bound, by the same governing documents, to honor mutual obligations between owners and the 
community association.31  Finally, each owner in a community contributes economically to the 
community association which represents the collective.32  Summed up, “[t]he distinctive feature 
of a common-interest community is the obligation that binds the owners of individual lots or 
                                                          
26 Statistical Review 2012:  For U.S. Homeowners Associations, Condominium Communities and Housing 
Cooperatives, National and State Data, FOUND. FOR CMTY. ASS’N. RESEARCH (2012), 
http://www.cairf.org/foundationstatsbrochure.pdf.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000). 
30 An introduction to Community Association Living, CMTY. ASS’N INST. 4 (2006), 
http://www.caionline.org/events/boardmembers/Documents/IntroToCALiving.pdf. 
31 Id. at 4 
32 Id. 
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units to contribute to the support of common property, or other facilities . . . whether or not the 
owner uses the common property or facilities, or agrees to join the association.”33  There are 
three primary types of common interest community found in America today: (1) planned 
communities; (2) condominiums; and (3) housing cooperatives.34  Each of these types will be 
addressed in kind. 
 In planned communities, homeowners generally have exclusive ownership of the lot they 
purchased and the detached housing unit atop it; their purchase, however, also requires that they 
be members in the governing community association.35  With ownership of the lot and unit in the 
hands of individual owners, the common areas in a planned community are typically recreational 
areas, grounds, and, in some cases, roads that are owned by the association.36  Since homeowners 
in planned communities individually own their entire lot and housing unit, their homes will be 
covered under the IHP.37  Any property the owners do share, such as recreational areas and 
grounds38 are not of the type that that the IHP would cover even if individually owned.39 
 Unlike planned communities, condominium ownership involves a greater degree of 
shared ownership.40   Put most generally, the interior space of each unit in a condominium 
community belongs exclusively to the individual homeowner, while the remaining areas are 
                                                          
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. a (2000). 
34 See CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., supra note 30, at 6. 
35 Id. at 6–7. 
36 Id. 
37 42 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (c)(2)−(3) (West 2013).  See also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, Help After A Disaster: 
Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program, FEMA 545 5–6 (July 2008), 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/assistance/process/help_after_disaster_english.pdf. 
38 See CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
39 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 37, at 5–6.  It is worth pointing out here that, although 
individual owners in planned communities will typically qualify for IHP coverage, they still face a unique hardship 
in the aftermath of disasters.  Following Sandy, community association in a number of gated communities in New 
York were left with immense costs to repair damage to their communal infrastructure.  Joseph Berger, Enclaves, 
Long Gated, Seek to Let In Storm Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/nyregion/new-york-city-enclaves-long-gated-want-to-let-in-storm-
aid.html?_r=0.    
40 See CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
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owned collectively by all unit owners, as tenants in common.41  Thus, in most circumstances the 
physical boundaries of a unit and the land upon which it rests on are the domain of the 
community association.42  Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, which some 
states have modeled their own statutes on,43 a common interest community is not a condominium 
“unless the undivided interests in the common elements are vested in the unit owners.”44  Thus, 
in the case of condominiums, quite literally, the common areas are co-owned by the individual 
unit owners.45 
 Condominiums can take a variety of different forms. 46  They might be apartment 
buildings, townhouses, or, less frequently, detached single family dwellings.47  The make-up of a 
given condominium community might have a practical effect on which property elements will be 
shared.48  Where, as in most cases, a condominium takes the form of an apartment building or 
attached townhouses, the exterior walls will likely be property shared in common by the 
individual owners.49  In rarer circumstances, however, individual units which are detached, and 
thus do not physically share a structural portions of their home, are unlikely to designate exterior 
walls, or even their roofs, as common property.50  These distinctions will all be managed by the 
                                                          
41 See Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegal, Trust and Community: The Common Interest Community as Metaphor 
and Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. 1111, 1115 n. 16 (2007); DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897; see also  WAYNE S. 
HYATT & SUSAN B. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES & MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST 
COMMUNITIES 5 (2d ed. 2008). 
42 See CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
43 See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 896. 
44 UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §1-103 (8) (1982). 
45 Id.; see also DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897. 
46 See CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
47 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1115 n.16; see also CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., supra note 30, at 7.  
48 Franzese and Siegel explain that a common interest community’s allocation of collectively held elements will be 
affected by its status as either a territorial (individual units spread across a large piece of real estate) or non-
territorial (usually a single building). Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1115 n.16. 
49See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897. 
50 The Community Associations Institute explains that while condominiums are popularly conceived of as apartment 
buildings, they can also take other forms such as a mobile home park.  In such a circumstance, the owner would 
individually own the entire mobile home structure, but would have a shared interest in all of the remaining property 
on which the unit rests.  See CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
8 
“declaration of condominium,” which is filed before any sales in a complex are made. 51  
Importantly, where the declaration designates only the interior of a unit for individual ownership, 
as is most often the case, the remaining exterior elements like walls, roofs, and hallways will be 
under the control of the community association, putting them at risk of falling into the IHP 
coverage gap.52  
Somewhat distinct from the condominium is the housing cooperative. In a housing 
cooperative, the owner of the entire property, including the individual unit, is the cooperative 
corporation.53  When a person buys into a housing cooperative, they are purchasing shares of 
stock in the cooperative corporation.54  The corporation, in which the resident is now a part-
owner, then leases the individual unit to the resident.55  Thus, “the owner of a cooperative 
apartment is technically both the owner of shares in the cooperative corporation and a tenant of 
that corporation.”56  While it is possible for housing cooperatives to take different physical 
forms, this type of common interest community is almost exclusively found in apartment 
buildings.57 
 The cooperative corporation is notable for a couple of reasons.  First, while technically 
the cooperative owner “leases” a unit, it is anything but a typical lease.58  The leases are almost 
always for an extended period of time.59   In many circumstances, a cooperative lease is a 
                                                          
51 See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897–98. 
52 See Navarro, supra note 19. 
53 Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu, & Jonathan Miller, The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical 
Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 277 (2007). 
54 Id. at 277. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1115 n.16. 
58 This type of lease is distinct from a typical land-lord-tenant arrangement because in housing cooperatives the 
tenants own the subject building as a group and are thus “collectively their own landlord.”  See Henry B. Hansmann, 
Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 25, 26 (1991). 
59 See Schill, Voicu, & Miller, supra note 53, at 277 (describing the typical lease period as a “significant period of 
time (typically 99 years)”). 
9 
“proprietary lease” entitling the lessee to perpetual occupancy of the unit.”60  Whatever the 
official length of the lease, it is evident that a cooperative owner’s “lease” is radically different 
than a renter’s lease from an individual property owner.61  Second, a cooperative owner’s stock 
in the corporation is freely transferable; thus, the stock and its accompanying right to occupancy 
can be sold for whatever price the market commands. 62   A housing cooperative member 
“effectively has a perpetual, exclusive, and freely transferable property right in the physical unit 
he occupies.”63  
   The final distinctive feature of the housing cooperative form is that the cooperative 
property is typically secured by a single blanket mortgage for which the corporation is 
responsible.64  If one member of the cooperative fails to make payment for their individual share 
of the mortgage interest or taxes, it is up to the other members to make up the deficiency.65  
Therefore, in housing cooperatives, the financial stability of the collective is very much 
dependent on the contribution of the individual. 
 Despite members’ proprietary rights to occupy or sell their units and the corporation’s 
unique reliance on those members for survival, housing cooperatives are wholly excluded from 
the IHP coverage since virtually all of their property is collectively owned through the 
corporation.66 
III. The Disaster Relief Available to Qualifying Homeowners under the Stafford 
Act’s Individuals and Households Program: 
 
                                                          
60 See Hansmann, supra note 58.  
61 See Hansmann, supra note 58, at 26–27 (explaining that a cooperative owner’s “proprietary lease” is more akin to  
“owner-[occupied]” property than to “ordinary land-lord-tenant” relationships). 
62 Id. at 26–27. 
63 Id. 
64 See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 898. 
65 Id. at 898. 
66 See Navarro, supra note 19. 
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Section 408 of the Stafford Act empowers FEMA to “provide financial assistance, and, if 
necessary, direct services, to individuals and households in the State who, as a direct result of a 
major disaster, have necessary expenses and serious needs in cases in which the individuals and 
households are unable to meet such expenses or needs through other means.”67  For § 408 
purposes, “financial assistance” simply means cash grants that are provided to eligible 
individuals and households.68  While FEMA regulations allow for a relatively broad view of 
what constitutes a household,69  it is made explicitly clear that the IHP grants are not available 
for business losses.70  
There are two relevant types of assistance available to individuals and households under 
the IHP.71  First, FEMA may grant financial assistance for “the repair of owner-occupied private 
residences, utilities, and residential infrastructure damaged by a major disaster to a safe and 
sanitary living or functioning condition.”72  A safe home is one that is “secure from disaster-
related hazards or threats to occupants.”73  A sanitary home is one “free of disaster-related health 
hazards.”74  For a home to be considered functioning, it only needs to be “capable of being used 
for its intended purpose.”75  With respect to repairs, a victim receiving assistance is not required 
to show that their needs could have been met through other means, except with respect to 
                                                          
67 U.S.C.A. § 5174(a)(1) (West 2013). 
68 Emergency Mgmt. and Assistance, 44 C.F.R. § 206.111 (West 2009). 
69 44 C.F.R. § 206.111 (West 2009) (defining “household” as “all persons (adults and children) who lived in the pre-
disaster residence who request assistance under this subpart, as well as any persons, such as infants, spouse, or part-
time residents who were not present at the time of the disaster, but who are expected to return during the assistance 
period”). 
70 44 C.F.R. § 206.113 (West 2009). 
71 In addition to grants for repairs and replacement there is also two other forms of assistance offered under § 5174:  
(1) “temporary housing,” under § 5174(c)(1); and (2) “permanent housing construction,” for “insular areas outside 
the continental U.S.,” under § 5174(c)(4). 
7242 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (c)(2)(A)(i)(West 2013). 
73 44 C.F.R. § 206.111. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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insurance proceeds.76  Where insurance proceeds are capable of covering an individual’s repairs, 
and where there is no reason to think such proceeds will be significantly delayed, the homeowner 
is not eligible for IHP repair grants.77  FEMA is also empowered under the IHP to provide 
“financial assistance for the replacement of owner-occupied private residences damaged by a 
major disaster,”78 up to the maximum amount of the program’s power.79 
While neither the Stafford Act nor the accompanying regulations explicitly detail the 
types of repairs that are eligible for IHP assistance, except to explain that a home must be safe 
and functional, an applicant guide designed by FEMA provides greater detail about the types of 
eligible repairs.80  The guide makes it clear that the standard is “safe and sanitary” and that the 
IHP will not simply “pay to return your home to its condition before the disaster.”81  Instead, 
returning a household to a “safe and sanitary condition” may include: fixing structural issues like 
the foundation, outside walls, or roof; repairing interior issues like windows, doors, floors, walls, 
ceilings, and cabinetry; and repairing septic and sewage systems, well water and other water 
systems, heating and air conditioning systems, utilities, or entrances and exits to a home.82  Thus, 
while the types of repairs available under IHP are many, they relate strictly to the core functions 
of a home.  Despite the long list of available home repairs covered by the IHP, monetary relief is 
capped at $25,000 per household per major disaster.83 
On its face, the IHP is designed to assist homeowners following major disasters by 
helping them to return their homes to a merely livable, safe condition.  FEMA’s view of 
                                                          
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 5174(c)(2)(B) (West 2013).  
77 44 C.F.R. § 206.113 (b)(6). 
7842 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (c)(3)(A)(West 2013). 
7942 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (h)(1)–(2) (West 2013) (The maximum amount is $25,000 per household, but this number  is 
subject to adjustment based on the consumer price index). 
80 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 37, at 5–6. 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 42 U.S.C.A § 5174 (h)(1) (West 2013). 
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community associations, however, has substantially limited the program’s effectiveness for a 
great number of homeowners.    
IV. The Gap in Coverage for Common Interest Communities under Section 408 of 
the Stafford Act and Hurricane Sandy 
 
 In passing the Stafford Act, Congress determined that federal assistance was necessary to 
combat the disruptions to the normal functioning of communities and the adverse effects upon 
individuals and families which are created by disasters.84  With respect to owners in common 
interest communities, however, this ambition is not being realized. 
 In the wake of a natural disaster, an obvious place for community associations to start 
looking for aid was Section 405 of the Stafford Act, which provides grants to private non-profit 
facilities.85  But this approach quickly runs into a road-block.  FEMA regulations explicitly state 
that a private non-profit facility must be providing essential, government-type services to the 
general public.86  While community associations are generally non-profit organizations, they are 
not open to the general public and they only provide services to their members.  Not surprisingly, 
FEMA takes a similar view that community organizations are private entities serving private 
property interests.87  One of FEMA’s disaster assistance policies states that a private non-profit 
facility will not meet the “open to the general public” standard if membership is restricted to a 
group of individuals holding an economic interest in the organization’s property, offering the 
specific example of a condominium association.88 
                                                          
84 42 U.S.C.A § 5121(a)(2) (West 2013). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 5172 (a)(3) (West 2013). 
86 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (West 2013) 
87 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,  Private Non-Profit (PNP) Facility Eligibility, DAP 9521.3 5 (July 18, 2007), 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/pa/9521_3.pdf. 
88 Id. at 5. 
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 Since FEMA, through its regulatory clarification, has foreclosed the availability of public 
assistance grants to community associations,89 the next most logical place for associations to 
look would be the IHP, described in Part III.90  For purposes of distributing financial assistance 
under the IHP, however, FEMA has determined that community associations are not individuals 
or households, but are instead “business associations.” 91  Since the IHP will not cover business 
losses, community associations are not able to request assistance grants under the program to 
repair or replace qualifying damages to property over which they maintain control.92 
 While some unit owners in planned communities and detached condominium housing 
may be able to submit individual IHP claims, the issue becomes more complicated for 
condominiums in apartment buildings, townhouses, or housing cooperatives where more of the 
physical property is shared.93  This is because elements of their physical units, such as roofs, 
exterior walls, heating and cooling systems, and plumbing,  are more likely to be shared between 
members and, thus, the domain of the community association.94   
An article from the New York Times, published shortly after Sandy, explained the 
problem concisely: “[C]o-op boards are prohibited from obtaining grants for common areas, and 
individual co-op owners cannot seek money for damage to their apartments’ walls and floors 
because those are usually the legal responsibility of the building.”95  Highlighting the damage to 
one particular Brooklyn co-op, the article goes on to describe “the wallpaper in the lobby is 
peeling by the yard.  The walls themselves show cracks and holes, as if assaulted by a 
                                                          
89 Id. 
90 42 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (West 2013). 
91 See Navarro, supra note 19. 
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sledgehammer.  The Boiler is barely sputtering along and may not last the year.”96  One resident, 
and secretary-treasurer of the co-op, asked, “How can [FEMA] do that? We’re not in business. 
We don’t make a profit . . . I think they don’t realize what co-ops are.”97  Likewise, the co-
president of a 10,000 person cooperative that sustained over $250,000 of damage after Sandy 
lamented, “[i]t is unconscionable that FEMA refuses to help the working class community of 
Glen Oaks Village . . . because we are a co-op.”98  He later added that “[t]o deny co-ops the 
ability to obtain FEMA grant money simply because of the type of housing choices their 
residents have made is shameful.”99  In a question and answer post on the web-site of The New 
Jersey Cooperator, user “Battered in Brick” inquired about FEMA coverage for flood damage 
that disabled her condominium’s boilers and elevators. 100   “Battered in Brick” was likely 
disappointed by the reply from attorney Hubert Cutolo, which explained “a condominium 
association—i.e., a non-profit corporation—would not qualify for disaster aid assistance under 
IHP.”101 
 That this gap in the Stafford Act’s coverage was brought to light in the wake of Sandy is 
no accident.  New York City is home to the vast majority of the housing cooperatives in the 
United States and, by and large, these cooperatives come in the form of owner occupied 
apartment buildings.102  By one count, there are over 400,000 cooperative apartments in New 
York City.103  Another source explains that, while a mere 10 percent of the country’s common 
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interest buildings are housing cooperatives, 80 percent of such communities found in New York 
are cooperative apartments.104  Thus, given the  high concentration of cooperative owners in the 
area, Sandy’s arrival in New York was especially suited to reveal the unique hardship disasters 
create for such homeowners and demonstrated the need for a change in the IHP.   
V. The Legislative Effort to Fill the Coverage Gap for Community Associations, 
and Why it Should Be Passed 
 
In the months following Hurricane Sandy, the need for a change in the IHP was quickly 
apparent.  To those affected, an obvious first approach was to call upon FEMA to reevaluate 
their policy towards community organizations applying for IHP aid.105   Congressman Steve 
Israel, a Democrat from New York, sent two letters to the Department of Homeland Security and 
to FEMA, imploring the agencies to reevaluate their policy toward homeowners associations.106   
Representative Israel explained his position that “FEMA’s policy is the result of not 
understanding the role of co-ops and condos in our community.”107   Likewise, members of 
housing cooperatives across the region expressed a similar view that FEMA should see 
community associations as an extension of the private homeowners which comprise them.108  
FEMA, however, insists that they are prevented from providing relief under the Stafford Act.109 
 After failing to convince FEMA to reevaluate their policy on community associations, 
Representative Israel proposed a legislative solution; he introduced a bill that would amend the 
Stafford Act to explicitly include condominiums and housing cooperatives in the IHP.110   
A. The Legislative Effort to Fill the IHP Coverage Gap 
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Representative Israel’s bill, along with an identical bill in the Senate sponsored by 
Senator Charles Schumer of New York,111  states its purpose unequivocally: “To amend the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide assistance for 
condominiums and housing cooperatives damaged by a major disaster . . . .”112 
 The bills start by adding two definitions to the Stafford Act, one for condominiums, and 
one for housing cooperatives. 113  The newly added definition of condominium explains:  
 The term ‘condominium’ means a multi-unit housing project in which each 
dwelling unit is separately owned, and the remaining portions of the real estate are 
designated for common ownership solely by the owners of those units, each 
owner having an undivided interest in the common elements, and which is 
represented by a condominium association consisting exclusively of all the unit 
owners in the project, which is, or will be responsible for the operation, 
administration, and management of the project.114 
 
This definition of condominium is indicative of the standard condominium form115 and would 
likely encompass all condominiums.  The definition is also careful to define the association so 
that it includes all individual unit owners, and only those unit owners.116   
The proposed bill’s newly added definition of housing cooperatives reads as follows:  
The term 'housing cooperative' means a multi-unit housing project in which each 
dwelling unit is subject to separate use and possession by one or more cooperative 
members whose interest in such unit, and in any undivided assets of the 
cooperative association that are appurtenant to such unit, is evidenced by a 
membership or share interest in a cooperative association and a lease or other 
document of title or possession granted by such cooperative as the owner of all 
cooperative property.117 
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As was the case with condominiums, the proposed definition of housing cooperative is consistent 
with typical understandings of the ownership form118 and will bring all homeowners in housing 
cooperatives within its reach.   
Most importantly, the bill adds to § 5174(b)(1) (the IHP) an explicit direction to include 
communities associations within the umbrella of “individuals and households,” stating:   
For purposes of providing financial assistance under subsections (c)(2)[Repairs] 
and (c)(3)[Replacement] with respect to residential elements that are the legal 
responsibility of an association for a condominium or housing cooperative, the 
terms 'individual' and 'household' include the association for the condominium or 
housing cooperative.119   
 
This addition makes it possible for the community association itself to seek aid for damaged 
common elements instead of the individual owners. 
Finally, since the adjustable $25,000 cap on grants in §5174(h) is most practical for 
single households, the bill proposes a “Special Rule for Condominiums and Housing 
Cooperatives,” that ultimately leaves its meaning to be determined by the President through 
regulation. 120 
 Representative Israel, after proposing the legislation, explained, “[a] storm does not 
discriminate where it hits, and FEMA should not be discriminating what type of homeowners it 
helps.”121  Other voices in New York have echoed Israel’s sentiment in support of the bill.  New 
York State Senator Tony Avella agrees, arguing that “homeowners of every kind deserve the 
same FEMA assistance when a storm hits.”122  Mark Weprin, a New York City councilman, adds 
that “Co-op residents deserve equal access to federal funds for repairs like those needed after 
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Hurricane Sandy.  I thank Congress Member Israel for introducing this legislation.” 123   In 
support of the bill, the Community Association Institute issued a call to action on their website, 
asserting that “[condominium and cooperative] homeowners and communities deserve the same 
disaster relief as any other homeowner and any other neighborhood.”124  These voices of support 
for the bill share a common realization that, with respect to the purpose of the IHP, homeowners 
in common interest communities are not meaningfully different from traditional homeowners. 
Denying coverage for community associations under the IHP is essentially the same thing as 
denying it to individual homeowners.   
A. The Proposed Amendments Reflect a More Reasonable View of Community 
Associations and Should be Passed 
 
 By designating community associations as businesses, FEMA has created an obvious 
hardship to homeowners in condominiums and housing cooperatives.125  A more reasonable view 
of the entity would recognize that community associations are inseparable from their members.  
The appropriateness of this view becomes even more pronounced when taken in the context of 
disaster relief.  The repair and replacement provisions of the IHP were intended to assist those 
living in “owner-occupied private residences” following major disasters.126  Thus, blocking IHP 
grants to cooperatives and community associations is only sensible if there is something peculiar 
to their ownership type that elevates them from the realm of mere homeowners or that uniquely 
equips them, relative to traditional homeowners, to recover from the disasters.  There is no 
reason to believe, however, that this is the case.  Ultimately, the best view of community 
associations is as extensions of the individual, private home owners of which they are comprised. 
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To be sure, the issue is not clear cut, and FEMA is not the first to struggle in assigning a 
legal identity to the ownership form.127  At various times, and in different contexts, community 
associations have been viewed as businesses, governmental-type entities, or simply private 
associations.128  Similarly, individual rights holders in cooperatives have been viewed as renters, 
investors, and most appropriately, as holders of real property. 129   No doubt, much of the 
confusion associated with the form of ownership is a result of the fact that community 
associations often resemble corporate entities in both name and governance.130  A closer look at 
both the make-up and the role of community associations, however, reveals that, while perhaps 
analogous to businesses in some superficial aspects, a much more realistic view of the 
community association is as an extension of the homeowner.   
 In advocating for the passage of Representative Israel’s proposed amendments to the 
Stafford Act, the remainder of this part explains first why cooperative stock ownership should be 
viewed practically, as home ownership.  The focus then turns to an explanation of why a view of 
community associations as businesses is inconsistent with the views espoused by a number of 
courts.  Finally, the remainder of this Comment explains how, in the specific context of disaster 
relief, a view of community associations which denies them characterization as home owners 
works a particular hardship to the members of such communities, a hardship that can only be 
remedied by passage of Representative Israel’s amendments. 
1. Cooperative Stock as Real-Estate Ownership 
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Housing cooperatives present a special issue for individual ownership because the only 
thing that the individual technically holds is title to stock in the cooperative corporation, which in 
turn holds the actual title.131  This peculiar property arrangement raises questions about the 
nature of the individual’s ownership interest.132  
While recognizing the ambiguous nature of cooperative ownership, a number of courts 
facing these definitional issues have opted to place substance over form, ignoring semantic and 
technical distinctions, to find that cooperative shareholders are more akin to real property owners 
than mere renters or investors.  In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, for example, the 
Supreme Court was forced to answer the question of whether residents’ shares in a housing 
cooperative, referred to as “stock” when purchased, constituted “securities,” bringing them 
within the purview of the Securities Act of 1933133 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.134                   
The Securities Act of 1933 defined “security” broadly and included in its definition the phrase 
“any stock.”135  Despite this clear language, the court held that “form should be disregarded for 
substance,” insisting that “the emphasis should be economic reality.”136   
With a view targeting “economic reality” the court explained, “[c]ommon sense suggests 
that people who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in a state-subsidized cooperative, 
for their personal use, are not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing investment 
securities simply because the transaction is evidenced by something called a share of stock.”137  
In determining the nature of the individual’s property interest, the Court made clear that reducing 
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the issue to a literal examination of the chosen nomenclature, in this case a “stock,” is 
misplaced.138 
 Other courts have dealt with the definitional problems of co-op ownership similarly, 
focusing on the practical realities attendant to the ownership form.139  In a particularly thorough 
opinion, an Arizona court of appeals refused to “exalt form over substance in real property 
transactions,” and held that a cooperator acquires a real property interest when they purchase 
shares in a cooperative.140  The court explained that, with the exception of the fact that there is no 
title transfer, the stock purchase possesses all of the indicia of a real estate transaction.141  In the 
particular facts of the Arizona case, for instance, the purchaser chose a preferred location and 
neighborhood, provided a sizable initial investment, possessed an exclusive right to occupy the 
unit, and held an interest that was both devisable and assignable. 142 In other words, the court 
was, again, willing to delve below the superficial, and view the “stock purchase” for what it was: 
a real estate purchase. 
2. Community Associations are Inseparable Extensions of their Members  
 
 While housing cooperative members present a special issue in receiving grants for repairs 
to their individual apartments, the bigger issue, and the issue with which Congressman Israel’s 
legislation143 deals, is FEMA’s purported inability under the Stafford Act to offer IHP grants to 
any community associations, including cooperative corporations. 144   Like a literal view of 
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housing cooperative members, a formalistic view of community associations as businesses is 
misguided and fails to adequately consider the association’s make-up and functions.   
 There is no doubt that much of the impetus behind the desire to view community 
associations as business entities comes from the fact that they are typically organized as 
corporations under state corporate law; if viewed in isolation, however, that label is 
misleading.145  As an initial matter, community associations are almost always chartered as non-
profits.146  Associations function to protect their resident’s interests as property owners, not to 
maximize profits.147  Further, unlike profit driven corporate entities, community associations are 
comprised entirely of the residents they represent and are likewise controlled by a board of 
directors assembled from, and elected by, members of the same association.148  In fact, these 
officers and directors are not paid, their service is not typically treated as a career, and in many 
cases they have no formal training.149 
 Some courts, recognizing the unique character of community associations, have indicated 
a wariness to view community associations strictly as businesses.150  Generally, in corporate law, 
when a shareholder contests a board’s decision, courts will apply the business judgment rule.151  
Premised on the belief that a risk of liability will discourage boards from taking the type of risks 
necessary to maximize their value, the business judgment rule works to insulate boards from 
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liability.152  The Delaware Supreme Court explains that the rule represents a “presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”153  
The business judgment rule rests on a judicial deference to corporate boards, essentially allowing 
them to take whatever actions they believe are in the best interest of the company.154   
Despite the fact that community associations are technically incorporated entities, not all 
courts have afforded them the generous cover of the business judgment rule, a reality 
demonstrated by their use of a reasonability standard to review association decisions.155  One 
court applying a reasonability standard explained that associations “must balance individual 
interests against the general welfare” of the community at large.156  Implicit in the decision to 
test the reasonability of an association’s decision is a revelation by courts that unlike a typical 
corporation, associations have a “tremendous impact on the personal lives and homes of the 
association’s residents.”157  In fact, courts and commentators alike have argued that community 
associations often function more like governmental bodies than like businesses.158  This analogy, 
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likening community associations to local governments is more helpful in understanding an 
association’s true character than one likening it to a business entity.159   
Governments, at their best, exist to represent the populace from which they draw their 
power, to act in the best interest of the collective.  Community associations, similarly, exist as 
extensions of their individual property owners.  Reflecting this view, the California Court of 
Appeals explained in Cohen, “[l]ike any community, [the community association] consists of 
individual members who form in the aggregate an organic whole.”160  Instead of viewing the 
association and its property owners as wholly distinct entities, the court recognized that the latter 
are inseparable parts of the former.  This is not to say that community associations should be 
viewed simply as private governments,161 nor does the Cohen court imply that.162  The analogy 
to government simply offers a conceptual aid to understanding how community associations 
function with respect to their members.    
3. Denying IHP Grants to Community Associations Violates Basic Fairness 
The aptness of an analogy to government, and its use by courts, reveals the need to re-
characterize the superficial view of community associations as mere businesses.  This need for a 
definitional shift is even more pronounced when viewed in the context of disaster relief.  As 
described earlier, community associations are made up exclusively of individual owners, their 
boards are comprised of, and elected by, members of the association, and much of their decision-
making is governed by majority rule. 163   Most importantly, the community association functions 
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almost entirely with the money it raises in assessments from its own members.164  Consequently, 
when an association faces an emergency, it is, in reality, its member-homeowners who face an 
emergency.165   
The community association exists for the purpose of representing its members’ interests 
as homeowners, thus a harm to the association is necessarily a harm to its members. The Court of 
Appeals of New York espoused this view of community associations in Neponsit Property 
Owners' Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, a seminal case in the development of 
common interest communities.166 Affirmatively answering the question of whether community 
associations could enforce covenants running with the land (in this case, the payment of dues) on 
behalf of their members, the court explained that community associations were formed as “a 
convenient instrument by which the property owners may advance their common interests.”167  
To the Neponsit court then, community associations were an extension of their members and the 
association was simply a convenient way to represent their interests as homeowners.168  If the 
Stafford Act is directed at protecting homeowners from the tragedies attendant to disasters by 
helping them repair and replace their homes, refusing to provide aid to community associations 
runs directly contrary to that goal, because a hardship to the association is a hardship to the 
individual owner.169 
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There is no reason to think that extending IHP coverage to community associations offers 
any unique benefits to homeowners in common interest communities.  Representative Israel’s 
amendment does not lift any restrictions on the type of repairs and replacements eligible for 
grants under the IHP program.170  Just like the grants available to traditional homeowners, grants 
offered to community associations under the amendments will be for the limited purpose of 
returning homes to a “safe and sanitary” condition.171  There is no special benefit conferred upon 
homeowners in common interest communities under the amended version of the Stafford Act. 
Despite their reliance on community associations, homeowners in common interest 
communities are not substantially better equipped to respond to emergencies than traditional 
homeowners.  While many community associations will have insurance policies that protect 
against certain emergencies, such a policy is not likely to anticipate all emergencies.172  In the 
event that repair costs exceed the policy’s coverage, the excess will be covered by special 
assessments, drawn from the pockets of individual owners.173  Further, responsible homeowners 
not living in community associations can also insure their homes from disasters.  In fact, as the 
IHP is currently constituted, it anticipates that qualified homeowners might have insurance, but it 
does not deny them coverage on that ground.174   
  While it is also true that community associations often develop reserve funds for 
emergent repairs and needs,175 it is important to recognize that these funds generally anticipate 
predictable costs, like repairing common roofs or other long-term projects.176  Further, these 
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funds are supplied with money raised by the association through assessments on residents.177  
While the administration of the reserve fund is necessarily formal when administered by a 
community association, it is, in essence, nothing more than a budgetary strategy that most 
responsible homeowners can and should practice, even if in a less formal capacity.  
Reserve funds and insurance policies aside, the fact of the matter is that when a major 
disaster strikes, homeowners in common interest communities are left to bear the costs just like 
any other homeowner.178  When there is damage to a common element that is under the legal 
control of the community association, like a shared roof, wall, furnace, or boiler, the Stafford Act 
is not armed to offer the same repair grants it could to an individual homeowner.179  While the 
cost of repairing commonly held property will ultimately be paid by individual owners, the 
determination that community associations are businesses prevents them from receiving the same 
grants as other homeowners.180 
This characterization of community associations not only runs contrary to the substantive 
realities of the ownership form, it creates a result that violates basic fairness.  This lack of 
fairness is even more glaring when considered alongside the reality that many residents who live 
in common interest communities are doing so out of necessity and not because of any 
meaningful choice on their part.181  The number of common interest communities in the United 
States continues to grow each year, and in many areas housing markets are saturated with 
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common interest communities.182 As a result, this trend has deprived many home buyers of 
meaningful choice.183   
Adding to the unfairness of this reality, it is worth noting that much of the growth of 
common interest communities in housing markets across the country has been fueled by local 
governments.184  Local governments favor common interest communities because it allows them 
to widen their tax base while at the same time providing fewer services than they would if 
traditionally owned homes were built.185  As local governments continue to struggle with budget 
crises of their own, it is likely that this trend will continue, 186  placing more and more 
homeowners in the coverage gap created by their non-inclusion in the Stafford act’s IHP 
program.   
VI. Conclusion: 
The Stafford Act, as presently constituted, unfairly excludes community associations 
from its IHP.187  This exclusion is the result of an overly formal interpretation of community 
associations as business entities. 188   While such an interpretation may be superficially 
comprehensible, it distorts the reality that community associations are inseparable from the 
individual homeowners they represent.  Thus, the exclusion of community associations from IHP 
coverage results in the practical exclusion of individual homeowners from the very relief the 
program purports to offer.  The hardship this gap in coverage creates is uniquely apparent in the 
                                                          
182 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1125.  
183 See id. at 1125. 
184 See id. at 1119–24; HYATT& FRENCH, supra note 41, at 3–4.   
185 See HYATT& FRENCH, supra note 41, at 3–4. 
186 Id. 
187 See Navarro, supra note 19. 
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wake of Hurricane Sandy, where thousands of condominium and cooperative owners were told 
they were not eligible for the same grants as similarly situated traditional home owners.189 
 This clear inequity would be remedied by the amendment to the Stafford Act that has 
been introduced in both houses of Congress.190  The amendment allows cooperative corporations 
and condominium associations to seek coverage under the IHP program.191  Since a community 
association is properly viewed as a collective of homeowners, this amendment offers no new 
benefits to anyone the Stafford Act’s IHP program purported to assist in the first place.  
Cooperative Corporations and Condominium associations will qualify for exactly the same types 
of repairs and replacements as traditional homeowners, allowing them to bring their homes back 
to a safe and sanitary condition.192 
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